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Abstract
There are two main components of malware analysis. One is static malware analysis and the other
is dynamic malware analysis. Static malware analysis involves examining the basic structure of
the malware executable without executing it, while dynamic malware analysis relies on examining
malware behavior after executing it in a controlled environment. Static malware analysis is typically
done by modern anti-malware software by using signature-based analysis or heuristic-based analysis.
This thesis proposes the use of deep neural networks to learn features from a malware’s portable
executable (PE) to minimize the occurrences of false positives when recognizing new malware. We
use the EMBER dataset for training our model and compare our results with other known malware
datasets. We show that using a simple deep neural network for learning vectorized PE features is not
only effective, but is also less resource intensive as compared to conventional heuristic detection
methods. Our model achieves an Area Under Curve (AUC) of 99.8% with 98% true positives
at 1% false positives on the Receiver Output Characteristics (ROC) curve. We further propose
the practical implementation of this model to show that it can potentially compliment or replace
conventional anti-malware software.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The concept of malware detection mainly deals with analyzing executable files to establish malicious
intent. Since the advent of anti-malware software, we have seen a rise in sophisticated malware
which are specifically designed to circumvent this software. This in turn has spearheaded research
into more advanced detection techniques. Malware analysis or malware detection can be performed
in two ways: statically, and dynamically.
Static Malware Detection: Static malware detection is the process of analyzing a binary
file without executing it. This can involve disseminating the file entirely and examining every
component, using a disassembler to reverse engineer it, or converting it into assembly code to
examine its flow [SH12]. It can also extend to the original source code of the software if available
[ESKK12]. This is usually the first line of defense against malware used by all anti-malware software.
Dynamic Malware Detection: Dynamic malware detection uses behavior analysis while a
malware is running to determine malicious intent. Usually, this is done in a sandbox environment
to ensure that the executable does not cause any harm to the target system. This form of analysis
is usually resource intensive and can be circumvented in various ways. Debuggers can also be used
to analyze system calls or other behavioural patterns which cannot otherwise be detected using
black box testing [Ker16].
For the scope of this thesis, we will be focusing only on static malware detection.
Machine learning has long been used for classifying data with complex characteristics that
cannot be easily determined using mathematical functions. Deep neural networks are used today
for various different applications including (but not limited to) data classification, data prediction,
image recognition, natural language processing, and so on. This versatility of neural networks is
perfect for something like big data where large amounts of data is available, but processing it to
1

obtain a specific result is computationally expensive.
Until recently, the lack of availability of labeled datasets for supervised learning had slowed
down progress in using machine learning or deep learning for malware detection. Igor Santos et
al. proposed OPEM [SDB+ 13] as static-dynamic approach to use machine learning for detecting
unknown malware. They proposed analyzing operational codes obtained from disassembly of executables and analyzing their execution trace to determine malicious intent. Similarly, a dynamic
malware detection framework for Android called DroidDolphin managed to achieve 86.1% accuracy
[WH14] using dynamic malware analysis. Both methods are generally computationally expensive
and suffer from limited availability of labeled data.

1.1

Objective

The main objective of this thesis is to design and evaluate a deep neural network for statically
analyzing portable executable files to classify them as malicious or benign. For this purpose we use
the EMBER dataset [AR18] containing data extracted from portable executables of known malicious
and benign files. We use the hashing-trick [WDA+ 09] for creating a mathematical summary of the
features and standardizing our input vector.
We proceed to compare our model to similar models proposed previously for tackling static
analysis of malware. We show a model simulating practical implementation of such a model for
further research. We provide complete sources for reproducing the proposed model and the derived
results.

1.2

Outline

• Chapter 1 introduces the concepts covered in this thesis.
• Chapter 2 talks about previous work done in the fields of static malware analysis and the
machine learning approach used in malware detection.
• Chapter 3 describes the various aspects of portable executable files which need to be studied
before understanding the proposed model. It briefly covers the dataset used for our model
and how it relates the portable executable file format.
• Chapter 4 describes in detail the steps and processes involved in implementing our model
along with the entire structure of the final model.
2

• In Chapter 5 we discuss the experiments conducted on our model and their implications in the
real world. Resources to access the source code for the model and all experiments conducted
are included in the chapter.
• Chapter 6 summarizes the contents of the thesis, the model, and areas of research that have
not been covered in this thesis. It also talks about potential gaps in this thesis and research
that could be done to bridge these gaps.

3

Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this section, we cover work published in using machine learning for malware detection. Some
implementations are similar to the ones covered in this thesis, but are not reproducible due to the
lack of availability of the data set used, or the use of proprietary frameworks for obtaining results.
We also cover some related work in this field which deals with malware detection on other platforms
using static as well as dynamic analysis of files.

2.1

Static Malware Analysis

There are various challenges involved with static malware analysis. Most of these problems can
be solved by using dynamic malware analysis such as file corruption during runtime, code obfuscation or encrypted binary executable files. Below, we explore some of these problems and the
shortcomings of semantic-analyzers in solving them.

2.1.1

Signature Avoidance

Typically, anti-virus software use a signature based method to detect malware. The instructions
present in the malware executable are parsed to obtain a unique signature identifying the malware
which is then compared to a large database of known malware signatures [EMO12, OSM11]. Bonfante et al. proposed a control flow graph method to combat this problem [BKM07]. They used
a graph with nodes for all commonly used assembly instructions, and then used a reduced version
of this graph as a signature to classify malware. According to their tests, this form of detection
resulted in better overall detection accuracy when the graphs were larger (for larger executables).

4

2.1.2

Code Obfuscation

Static malware analysis has mainly been studied from the perspective of semantic analysis and
source code analysis for classification. Moser et al. proposed a method for obfuscating code from
semantic analysis [MKK07] simply by using opaque constants to obscure program control flow.
This highlights a significant flaw in static malware analysis techniques present today with semanticaware analysis wherein semantic analysis can be beaten by introducing a randomized approach to
calculating constants in real time. One such method mentioned is to use a random seed to generate
addresses where variables are stored, or to daisy-chain the process and store variables in addresses
present in other addresses. The introduction of a NP-hard algorithm to determine the value of
certain constants in the code was also discussed in this paper. For example, implementing a 3SAT
problem in code such that the input variables to this section code will always return a static value
(say 0). This means that the program will always generate a value of 0 during run time when any
variable is assigned to the 3SAT algorithm. Although this is easy to determine by a human reading
the code, it is very difficult for a semantic-aware analyzer to determine all possible outputs of this
algorithm and finally determine that the output of this is always 0, since the algorithm cannot be
computed in polynomial time. Code obfuscation using encryption on binary files multiple times
and then bundling a tool for decryption was discussed by Christodorescu and Jha [CJ06]. This
form of obfuscation is easy to catch during runtime by analyzing the decrypted file in memory, but
it is difficult to determine the level of encryption of the file without first decryption and analyzing
it dynamically.
A semantics based approach which proposed a metric for gauging the similarity between original
malware code and obfuscated malware code was proposed by Preda et al. [PCJD07]. It also
discussed methods to detect the inclusion of constant obfuscation (by adding NP-hard computation
or similar such methods) in malware code, NOP insertion, command substitution, and variable
renaming. However, the practical implementation of this approach has not been fully realized.
There are plenty of dynamic malware detection methods including call graph analysis [EMO12] and
identifying behaviour based on triggers [BHL+ 08]. However, these methods are computationally
expensive and require a sandbox infrastructure where malware can be safely executed and analyzed.

5

2.1.3

Software Packing

File packing is a common technique used when bundling large software in a small, compact package
[OSM11]. Such packaging techniques usually involve some form of encryption which can potentially
prevent easy identification of malware. One such tool called PolyPack [OBJ09] is specifically
designed to prove that packers are an effective method of evading anti-virus and anti-malware
software. They provide 10 packers which all independently pack the data provided to them, and
then scan the packed data with 10 well known anti-virus scanners. The packer with the best result
is picked. Their studies established that this improved evasion rates by 2.58 times against most
anti-virus software.

2.2

Machine Learning for Malware Detection

The fact that machine learning performs better with larger datasets is well established [BB01].
Several studies have been published which use machine learning for malware classification. Various
methods such as dynamic analysis of system calls [KZWE16], registry access monitoring [HSKS03],
hidden Markov model based analysis [AMS09] have been proposed for dynamic malware analysis.
Kolter and Maloof [KM04] proposed the use of n-grams by combining 4 byte sequences to
produce approximately 255 million distinct n-grams. This paper proposed the use of a probabilistic
approach for determining which features were relevant and used the top 500 n-grams for analysis.
The paper proposed the use of Naive Bayes, Support Vector Machine (SVM), and J48 decision tree
for analyzing their data. Data used for analysis was primarily sourced from Sourceforge and VX
Heavens (actual data not disclosed) with 1971 benign executables and 1651 malicious executables
tested. The small sample set used in this research, and the fact that the exact dataset used by
the authors is not available, it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of these results when used with
larger datasets. A similar study was done by Bagga [Bag17] using this approach with the Microsoft
Malware Classification [RRF+ 18], which is an arguably large dataset. However, this study focused
on the malware classification problem rather than the malware detection problem.
Raman, from the Product Incident Response Team at Adobe Systems Inc. proposed a method
to classify malware by extracting seven least correlated features from portable executables [R+ 12].
The features extracted were DebugSize, ImageVersion, IatRVA, ExportSize, ResourceSize, VirtualSize, NumberOfSections. A dataset containing 100,000 malicious executables and 16,000 benign
executables was used for experimentation. Various models were tested using this data. Amongst
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the models tested, the J48 decision tree [Qui93] obtained the best results: a true positive rate of
0.986 with a false positive rate of 0.057. The resulting trained model was released as a free tool
for malware classification, but the dataset was not published to perform any form of comparative
research. Anderson and Roth further tested this trained model with the EMBER dataset [AR18]
and found that it exhibited a false positive rate of 0.53 and a false negative rate of 0.08.
A dynamic malware classification model using deep neural networks called MtNet was proposed
by Huang and Stokes in 2016 [HS16]. The dataset used for this study was provided by Microsoft
Corporation containing 6.5 million sample files. From this dataset, 2.85 million malicious and 3.65
million benign files were extracted. Training features were extracted during file execution at runtime
consisting of mainly two types of data: system function calls and null-terminated objects. Feature
selection was performed using mutual information proposed by Manning et al. [MRS10] to get a
total of 50,000 input features. The final goal was to classify malware first as benign or malicious, and
then classify the malicious malware into one of 100 known malware families. The ReLU activation
function was used along with dropout layers added for better model performance. Although this
model shows impressive results of under 0.07% false positive rates, the lack of availability of the
test data set and the model code used for testing makes reproducing these results impossible.
Echo state network and recurring neural network based malware classifiers have also been tested
for dynamic analysis of malware by Pascanu et al. [PSS+ 15]. Their research established the use
of an echo state network based recurrent model with the sigmoid (logistic regression) activation
function for dynamic analysis of malware. The exact input vector was not disclosed, however it
was derived from the API calls performed by files during runtime execution. The model achieved
a true positive rate of 0.983 with a false positive rate of 0.001. The authors acknowledge that the
dataset used in this research was sourced internally, and is not publicly available. The purpose
of this research was to establish that recurrent neural networks can be used for dynamic malware
analysis. However, due the the dataset not being available, and the steps required to reproduce
the proposed model not provided, it is difficult to verify these results and conduct further research
based off of it.

2.2.1

Feature Selection

Machine learning is very sensitive to the feature set being used for training. Various studies have
established certain features to be beneficial for effective training of machine learning based malware
classifiers. We discuss some of these approaches.
7

Divandari et al. proposed extracting opcode data from files and using a Markov Blanket approach to summarizing the feature set [DPJ15]. Since opcodes themselves are a significant portion
of executables, they have been considered as reliable features for malware detection [Bil07]. The
proposed model uses a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) for malware classification.
The byte histogram approach proposed by Saxe and Berlin in their research [SB15] introduced a
format-agnostic method of extracting features from a file. This method is an innovative approach to
extracting byte information as features from a file without requiring information about the actual
function of those bytes. It proposes to extract a histogram of all byte values present in the binary
file along with a 2 dimensional byte-entropy histogram to establish an understanding of potential
encryption or compression used in the file. We use this method in our model to complement the
header extraction method such that we achieve high accuracy without the high overheads required
for vectorizing all bytes in the portable executable.
The feature hashing trick proposed by Weinberger et al. [WDA+ 09] has been frequently cited
and used for machine learning models. The input vector for most machine learning based models is
static and cannot be increased in size depending upon input size. Therefore, we need a method to
effectively summarize large input features into a static size which is more manageable for training.
The feature hashing trick proposes a method to effectively reduce the dimensionality of data such
that it still sufficiently represent the original intended data, but offer linear separable features for
training a model effectively.

2.2.2

Boosted Decision Trees and Artificial Neural Networks

Decision tree have been around for a long time. However, with the recent advancement in the
boosting method for decision tree models, they have proved to be similar or better in performance
than artificial neural networks. They are relatively easier to tune and work well with large number
of variables [RYZ+ 05]. With the advent of AdaBoost, boosting of decision tree models has managed
to go from binary classification to multi-category classification [HRZZ09, Sch03]. This spurred the
use of boosted decision tree based models as alternatives for artificial neural networks. The model
we propose in this thesis is compared to an existing boosted decision tree model for the same dataset
that we use for our model. Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil established in their paper [CNM06] that
state vector machines, boosted decision trees and neural nets have comparable performance in most
scenarios with variance mainly limited to hyper-parameter tuning.

8

Chapter 3
Background
This section briefly describes the portable executable (PE) file format and its header. We discuss
the methodology used in extracting data from the portable executable file and generating input for
our model. Section summarizes the structure of the EMBER dataset used for training our model.
The methods used for hashing and standardizing the data are summarized in section.

3.1

Portable Executable Format

The portable executable (PE) format (Figure 3.1) was introduced by Microsoft with the Windows
NT 3.1 operating system. Since its inception, it has seen several improvements to incorporate it
into newer versions of Windows. Unix uses the ELF format which is analogous to the Windows PE
format.
The scope of this thesis is limited to Windows executables since data available for malware
running on Unix based operating systems is limited. However, the COFF header found in PE
files is common to both Unix and Windows environments [Kat93]. Our proposed model analyzes
features extracted from PE files to determine whether the file is malicious or benign. This section
describes the information that can be obtained from PE files.

3.1.1

MS-DOS Stub

This stub is executed whenever the file is executed in an MS-DOS environment. Its only purpose is
to print a message indicating that the file cannot be run in the MS-DOS environment. A signature
added after the MS-DOS Stub indicates that the file is in PE format. [Cen19]

9

Figure 3.1: PE File Format [Com16]
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3.1.2

COFF Header

The Common Object File Format (COFF) header exists right after the MS-DOS Stub. The COFF
Header structure is defined in Table 3.1. All possible values for the Machine field and Characteristics
field in the COFF header are defined in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 respectively.
Offset
0

Size
2

Field
Machine

2
4

2
4

NumberOfSections
TimeDateStamp

8
12
16
18

4
4
2
2

PointerToSymbolTable
NumberOfSymbols
SizeOfOptionalHeader
Characteristics

Description
Identifies the target machine that the executable can
run on. Refer to Table 3.2
Size of the section table. (follows the header table)
Date of Creation. Represented as seconds after January
1, 1970.
File offset of COFF symbol table. 0 for no table.
Number of entries in the symbol table.
Size of the optional header (required for executables)
Indicates the attributes of the file. Refer to Table 3.3.

Table 3.1: COFF Structure [Cen19]
A file can only be executed on a machine if the machine field matches the target machine the
file is to be executed on.

3.1.3

Optional Header

Files which are considered as executables (images) have an additional optional header. This header
provides information to the loader present in the operating system which is responsible for handling
execution of executable files. Although this header is required for executable files, it can also be
present in object files. Optional headers in object files serve no purpose except to increase file size.
Size of the optional header is defined in the SizeOfOptionalHeader field in the COFF header. A
magic number present in the optional header determines whether the executable is PE32 or PE32+
as is shown in table 3.4.
PE32+ executables allow 64-bit memory address space, but can be no more than 2 gigabytes
in size. The optional header is split into 3 major parts defined in Table 3.5.
Standard fields in the optional header are defined for every COFF implementation (Windows
and Unix). Following is a summary of the information contained in the section:
• Magic number indicating whether the file is a normal executable (0x10B), a ROM image
(0x107), or a PE32+ executable (0x20B).
• Linker version to be used for this PE file.
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Constant
IMAGE FILE MACHINE UNKNOWN
IMAGE FILE MACHINE AM33
IMAGE FILE MACHINE AMD64
IMAGE FILE MACHINE ARM
IMAGE FILE MACHINE ARM64
IMAGE FILE MACHINE ARMNT
IMAGE FILE MACHINE EBC
IMAGE FILE MACHINE I386
IMAGE FILE MACHINE IA64
IMAGE FILE MACHINE M32R
IMAGE FILE MACHINE MIPS16
IMAGE FILE MACHINE MIPSFPU
IMAGE FILE MACHINE MIPSFPU16
IMAGE FILE MACHINE POWERPC
IMAGE FILE MACHINE POWERPCFP
IMAGE FILE MACHINE R4000
IMAGE FILE MACHINE RISCV32
IMAGE FILE MACHINE RISCV64
IMAGE FILE MACHINE RISCV128
IMAGE FILE MACHINE SH3
IMAGE FILE MACHINE SH3DSP
IMAGE FILE MACHINE SH4
IMAGE FILE MACHINE SH5
IMAGE FILE MACHINE THUMB
IMAGE FILE MACHINE WCEMIPSV2

Value
0x0
0x1d3
0x8664
0x1c0
0xaa64
0x1c4
0xebc
0x14c
0x200
0x9041
0x266
0x366
0x466
0x1f0
0x1f1
0x166
0x5032
0x5064
0x5128
0x1a2
0x1a3
0x1a6
0x1a8
0x1c2
0x169

Description
Applicaple to any machine
Matsushita AM33
x64
ARM little endian
ARM64 little endian
ARM Thumb-2 little endian
EFI byte code
Intel 386 or equivalent
Intel Itanium processor family
Mitsubishi M32R little endian
MIPS16
MIPS with FPU
MIPS16 with FPU
Power PC little endian
Power PC with floating point support
MIPS little endian
RISC-V 32-bit address space
RISC-V 64-bit address space
RISC-V 128-bit address space
Hitachi SH3
Hitachi SH3 DSP
Hitachi SH4
Hitachi SH5
Thumb
MIPS little-endian WCE v2

Table 3.2: COFF: Machine Types [Cen19]
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Flag
IMAGE FILE RELOCS STRIPPED

Value
0x0001

IMAGE FILE EXECUTABLE IMAGE

0x0002

IMAGE FILE LINE NUMS STRIPPED
IMAGE FILE LOCAL SYMS STRIPPED
IMAGE FILE AGGRESSIVE WS TRIM

0x0004
0x0008
0x0010

IMAGE FILE LARGE ADDRESS AWARE

0x0020

IMAGE FILE BYTES REVERSED LO

0x0040
0x0080

IMAGE FILE 32BIT MACHINE

0x0100

IMAGE FILE DEBUG STRIPPED

0x0200

IMAGE FILE REMOVABLE RUN FROM SWAP

0x0400

IMAGE FILE NET RUN FROM SWAP

0x0800

IMAGE FILE SYSTEM
IMAGE FILE DLL
IMAGE FILE UP SYSTEM ONLY

0x1000
0x2000
0x4000

IMAGE FILE BYTES REVERSED HI

0x8000

Description
The file must be loaded at its
preferred base address because it
does not allow base relocation.
Set for valid files. Linker error if
this is not set.
Deprecated. Set to zero.
Deprecated. Set to zero.
Obsolete for Windows 2000 and
later. Set to zero.
Capable of handling addresses
more than 2GB.
Reserved.
Little Endian. Deprecated. Set
to zero.
Machine uses 32-bit architecture.
File does not have debug information.
Copy the image to memory if it
is on removable media.
Copy the image to memory if it
is on network media.
System File
DLL File. Cannot be executed.
Only support uniprocessor machine.
Big Endian. Deprecated. Set to
zero.

Table 3.3: COFF: Attribute Flags Available [Cen19]
Magic number
0x10b
0x20b

PE format
PE32
PE32+

Table 3.4: Optional Header Magic Number [Cen19]
Offset
(PE32/PE32+)
0

Size
(PE32/PE32+)
28/24

28/24
96/112

68/88
Variable

Header part
Standard fields
Windows-specific fields
Data directories

Description
Common for Windows and Unix
COFF implementations.
Defines windows specific features.
Address and size of special tables
used by OS.

Table 3.5: Optional Header Parts [Cen19]
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• Size of the code section. Code section refers to the text section of a PE file which contains
the actual software that will be run when the file is executed. There can be multiple such
code sections within the file, in which case, the header field will indicate the total size of all
the code sections combined. Code sections are also referred to as the .text section of a PE
file.
• Size of initialized and uninitialized data contained with the file. This is also referred to as
the .data section of a PE file.
• Address of the entry point of the file. This is where the instruction pointer will start when
the PE file is loaded into memory. [Cen19]
Windows specific fields contain certain information required specifically for Windows environments. It contains operating system version, image version (for example Word version 8.0), size
of the headers, size of the image, DLL characteristics, loader flags, length of the data directory,
the data directory itself, and the checksum. Size of the image determines how much address space
must be reserved by the operating system for the image to run. [Kat93]
The data directories give the address and size of directories required by Windows. This includes,
but is not limited to, import/export tables, resource table, exception table, etc. [Cen19]

3.1.4

Section Table

Every section in the PE file contains a section header which is 40 bytes in size. This defines the
name of the section, virtual size, number of lines, and various pointers (lines, raw data, relocations,
etc.) [Cen19].
Besides the sections described above, the PE file contains the software executable code. There
are a few other miscellaneous sections that can be included depending upon the file, but that is
beyond the scope of this thesis.

3.2

Training Dataset

Since our model analyzes PE files, the first challenge was to find a dataset that provides PE files
labeled to be malicious or benign. Up until the EMBER dataset was released in April 2018, it was
difficult to find datasets which classify malware as malicious or benign. This dataset is 9.1 GB in
size and provides 900K training samples with 300K malicious, 300K benign, and 300K unlabeled
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Offset
0

Size
8

Field
Name

8
12

4
4

VirtualSize
VirtualAddress

16
20
24
28
32
34
36

4
4
4
4
2
2
4

SizeOfRawData
PointerToRawData
PointerToRelocations
PointerToLinenumbers
NumberOfRelocations
NumberOfLinenumbers
Characteristics

Description
Name of the section represented as an 8-byte UTF-8
string.
Size of the section in memory.
Refers to the address of the first byte when loaded to
memory.
Size of the uninitialized data on disk.
File pointer to the first page of the section.
Set to zero for executable files.
Deprecated. Set to zero.
Set to zero for executable files.
Deprecated. Set to zero.
Characterstic Flags

Table 3.6: Section Header [Cen19]
samples. It also contains 200K test samples. The publishers of this dataset have also released the
source code that they used for creating this dataset. We use this code as a basis for extracting
features from binary files. [AR18]
The data is provided in JSON files in which every line is one sample. Each sample contains
parsed features, which are essentially features extracted from the PE header described in section
3.1, and format agnostic features as described below.
• SHA 256 Checksum.
• When was this file first seen.
• Label (0 for benign, 1 for malicious, -1 for unlabeled).
• Histogram of the raw bytes in the file.
• Entropy of the raw bytes in the file.
A summarized view of a sample from the training set is shown in Figure 3.2.
The inclusion of byte histogram and byte entropy histogram as seen in Figure 3.2 has previously
been seen in [SB15] for including format agnostic features as part of the data set.

3.2.1

Byte Histogram

The byte histogram is essentially a vector of size 256 with each index representing the frequency
of the corresponding byte value. For example, if there are 11203 occurrences of the byte value 200,
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Figure 3.2: JSON Sample

16

then the value present at index 200 of the histogram vector would be 11203 [AR18]. A detailed
explanation of this process can be found in section 4.1.1.

3.2.2

Byte Entropy Histogram

To compute the byte entropy histogram, a window of size 2048 bytes is moved over the input bytes
with a step size of 1024 bytes. The entropy of the entire 2048 byte window with the occurrence of
each individual byte in the window is computed and stored as a pair. This results in a total of 2048
pairs. Bins of size 16 x 16 are used to quantize the entropy and byte values [SB15, AR18]. These
values are normalized before training. Details of the byte histogram extraction process is given in
section 4.1.1 and the the normalization process is described in section 4.2.
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Chapter 4
Proposed Model
The model has 3 major components. They are as follows:
1. Feature Extraction and Hashing
2. Scaling and Normalization
3. Neural Network Classifier
We use Python for implementing our model due to its simplicity and flexibility of use in machine
learning applications [Oli07]. We leverage the Nvidia CUDA architecture [NBG08] for high speed
parallel computation using the Keras library [C+ 15] for implementing our neural network model.

4.1

Feature Extraction and Hashing

There are two main components of the PE file we extract in order to train our model:
1. Parsed Information
2. Raw Byte Information
The EMBER dataset [AR18] used in our model provides a convenient module to extract the
required data from any given PE file. We describe the processes involved in this module. In total,
our model uses 2351 input vectors for classification.

4.1.1

Parsed Information

Every PE file contains header information as described in Section 3.1. These features are extracted
in python using the LIEF library for parsing PE files [Tho17]. However, this information is not all
18

numerical and not always the same size. Our model uses input vectors of fixed size for training.
This means that all features extracted from the PE file must be brought to a standard size before
they can be used for model training. To achieve this, we use the FeatureHasher module from
the scikit-learn library [PVG+ 11] to implement the feature hashing trick [WDA+ 09] with a set
number of bins per header feature. Five groups of features are extracted from the PE file.

General Information
General features obtained from the PE file include:
• Virtual size
• Imported functions
• Exported functions
• Presence of debug section
• Resources
• Relocations
• Number of Symbols
This is basic information obtained from the PE header [AR18].

Header Information
We obtain specific information from the headers present in the PE file. From the COFF header,
we obtain the following information:
• Timestamp
• Target Machine (string)
• List of Image Characteristics (list of strings)
From the optional header we obtain the following:
• Target Subsystem (string)
• DLL Characteristics (list of strings)
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• Magic Number
• Major Image Version
• Minor Image Version
• Linker Version
• System Versions
• Subsystem Versions
• Code Size
• Header Size
• Commit Size
Features involving strings are first converted to their byte representation and then parsed through
the FeatureHasher to get 10 bins of summarized data. This ensures that the data is vectorized
and is of a fixed size [AR18].

Imported Functions
Imported address tables from the optional headers along with the imported function sorted by library are extracted from the PE file. This data is summarized using the FeatureHasher. 256
bins are used for summarizing all unique libraries and 1024 bins are used to represent every
library:FunctionName pair.

Exported Functions
All exported functions are extracted as strings and then summarized with 128 bins using the
FeatureHasher.

Section Information
Section tables are extracted with the following information:
• Section Name
• Virtual Size
20

• Size
• Entropy
• Virtual Size
• Section Characteristics (list of strings)
• Entry Point
The hashing trick is used on the Name:Value pairs. The name being the section name, and the
values being section size, section entropy and virtual size, each paired individually with a name.
These pairs are summarized using the FeatureHasher with each value set allotted 50 bins. Section
characteristics are captured separately using the same hashing trick as mentioned previously [AR18].

4.1.2

Raw Byte Information

Raw-byte information is included for platform agnostic analysis of the PE files. This means that
malware not designed for a Windows environment can also potentially be classified. We do not test
the accuracy of this model for non-Windows malware, so the effectiveness of this method for such
cases is not discussed.
Byte information extracted from files is not dependent on the type of file. It is simply the
representation of all bytes comprising the file. Since the size of these bytes is variable, we use a
method proposed by Saxe and Berlin [SB15] to summarize this data. This method has also been
implemented in the feature extraction module of the EMBER dataset [AR18].

Byte Histogram
Byte histogram is essentially the frequency of the occurrence of each byte value in a file. A byte
can have a value from 0 to 255, which means a histogram of these bytes will contain the frequency
of occurrence of 256 possible integer values. Algorithm 1 defines the steps involved in this process.
A graphical representation of a sample byte histogram is shown in Figure 4.1.

Byte-Entropy Histogram
Assuming a window size of 2048 bytes and a stride of 1024 bytes, we compute the entropy histogram
by sliding this window over the entire file, computing the Shannon entropy H of the 2048 byte
window, and plotting the joint distribution of this window with every byte present in it. For all
21

Algorithm 1: Compute Byte Histogram
Result: List of size 256 containing Byte Histogram
1 Initialize f ile
2 Initialize list count[256]
3 while f ile 6= EOF do
4
bytes ← f ile.read(buf size)
5
foreach value in bytes do Increment count[value]
6
7

end

Figure 4.1: Example of Byte Histogram
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bytes in the window such that X = {X1 , X2 ....Xn }, where P (Xi ) is the probability of the occurrence
of Xi in the proposed window, the entropy H(X) of the window to the base b is calculated as:
H(X) = −

n
X

P (Xi )logb P (Xi )

i=1

Here we will be calculating the entropy of the window to the base 2. Then we create a pair
P (H, X) where H is the entropy of the window, and X is the occurrence of the every byte in the
window. An example of a byte entropy histogram is given in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Example of Byte-Entropy Histogram

Printable Strings
Most PE files contain strings which are a valuable source of data. We are mainly interested in all
printable characters. All strings containing more than 5 printable characters are extracted from
the file. Extracted strings are categorized based on what they contain to create a group of features
which provide a statistical summary of the string contents of the file. Only the number of elements
contained in each category are used as model features. The categories are as follows:
• C:\ (case sensitive) indicating a Windows path
• http:// or https:// indicating a URL
• HKEY_ indicating a Windows registry key
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This serves two purposes: it can reveal certain characteristics of a file which are not revealed from
header information, and it protects the privacy of benign files since we are only creating a summary
of the string data. [AR18].

4.2

Scaling and Normalization

After extracting features from the PE file, we obtain 2351 features per sample. However, these
feature values are widely scattered with a large number of values being close to 0 and some of them
being over 109 and some of them being under −104 . This phenomenon is shown as a line graph for
one of the test samples in Figure 4.3. A scatter plot of this phenomenon made it difficult to see
the extreme points which made it necessary to plot a line graph.

Figure 4.3: Line graph of raw sample
When attempting to train our model with this kind of data, we saw that the model would not
converge and resulted in an AUC of 0.5. This was clearly due to the widely varying scales of the
extracted features which needed some form of normalization before being used in our model. We
use the statistical or Z-score normalization for this purpose [JS11].
Let the input sample be X = {X1 , X2 , X3 ....X2351 } where Xi represents the ith feature within
the sample. The statistical normalization of the sample X for each feature Xi is performed using
the equation:
Xi0 =

Xi − X̄
σ(X)
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Figure 4.4: Scatter plot of normalized sample
Where X̄ is the arithmetic mean of the sample X and σ(X) is the standard deviation of the
sample X. The arithmetic mean X̄ of X is calculated using the equation:
X̄ =

X
1 2351
Xi
2351 i=1

Where 2351 is the cardinality of the sample X. The standard deviation σ(X) of X is calculated
using the equation:
v
u
u 1
σ(X) = t

2351
X

2351

(Xi − X̄)2

i=1

A scatter plot of the normalized sample is given in Figure 4.4. We use the StandardScalar function provided in the scikit-learn library [PVG+ 11] for normalizing our samples. This function
performs the exact same calculations as explained above.

4.3

Neural Network Classifier

We use a deep neural network for analyzing our data. There were two neural networks constructed,
one with dropout layers, and one without dropout layers. We tested the logistic activation function
and the rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation function for both these networks. The Adam optimizer [KB14] implemented in the Keras library was used for gradient-based optimization of our
classifiers. A summary of both neural networks are shown in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, respectively.
The network without dropout layers contains 1 input layer which accepts an input vector of size
2351, 1 dense layer with 2400 neurons, 3 dense layers with 1200 neurons, and a binary output layer.
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Figure 4.5: Summary of neural network

Figure 4.6: Summary of neural network with dropout layers
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The second network with 2 dropout layers and 2 dense layers was proposed to test any potential
measurable improvements in performance when reducing the number of layers and introducing
dropout.

4.4

Model Summary

A summarized diagram of the model is shown in Figure 4.7. The entirety of the model consists of
the following:
• Extract header and platform agnostic features from the PE file.
• Use the hashing trick [WDA+ 09] to summarize header features.
• Flatten the features into a one dimensional input vector of size 2351.
• Normalize the features using statistical or z-score normalization.
• Feed the input vector through a densely connected deep neural network to obtain a binary
output.
The final output of this model is either a 0 or a 1. Where 0 indicates that the PE file being
tested is benign, and 1 indicates that the file is malicious.
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Figure 4.7: Flow diagram of the model
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Chapter 5
Experiments and Results
Here, we cover all experiments performed on our models and the steps taken to implement a working
classifier. We discuss the performance of our model and compare it to other models.

5.1

Experimental Setup

Our model was trained on a Dell Precision Tower with an Intel Xeon E3 processor, Nvidia GeForce
GTX 1080 Ti graphics card and 64GB of RAM. We implemented it in Python with the following
libraries installed:
• TensorFlow [ABC+ 16]
• Keras [C+ 15]
• NumPy [VDWCV11]
• scikit-learn [PVG+ 11]
• LIEF [Tho17]
• Pandas [M+ 10]
• MatPlotLib [Hun07]
There are also packages and libraries which the above libraries depend on, but are typically installed
automatically as part of the installation process. We use Anaconda Python [Ana16] with Python
3.6.7 for all experiments.
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5.2

Metrics for Model Testing

Before testing the model, it was important to identify the metrics to be used for this purpose. In
our case, we are testing the accuracy and diagnostic ability of our model. For this purpose, we
derive the receiver output characteristic (ROC) curve and find the area under curve (AUC). This
method generally provides a better measure of the diagnostic ability of a classifier as compared to
simply stating the overall accuracy of the model against a given test set [Faw06, Met78]. We also
derive the confusion matrix of the neural network based models and the decision tree based model
to make it easy to spot cases of misclassification which are not visible clearly from the ROC curve.
The ROC curve is derived by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) of a classifier against the
false positive rate (FPR). The TPR and FPR are calculated using the following equations:
TPR =

TP
TP
=
P
TP + FN

FPR =

FP
FP
=
N
FP + TN

Where T P is true positives, P is the total positive samples present in the test set, and F N is
false negatives. F P is false positives, N is the total negative samples present in the test set, and
T N is true negatives. We use the roc_curve, auc, and modules from scikit-learn.metrics to
obtain the ROC curve, and the confusion_matrix module from the same library to obtain the
confusion matrix. All data is plotted using MatPlotLib.
We used 200K test samples provided in the EMBER dataset [AR18] to test our model and
then compared our results to a decision tree based model created by the authors of EMBER using
LightGBM [KMF+ 17].

5.3

Test Results
Classifier Type
Neural Network (Sigmoid)
Neural Network with Dropout (Sigmoid)
Neural Network (ReLU)
Neural Network with Dropout (ReLU)
Decision Tree using LightGBM

AUC
0.998
0.998
0.997
0.997
0.999

TPR @ FPR = 0.01
0.981
0.978
0.982
0.989
0.982

Table 5.1: Summary of results for neural networks based classifiers, and for decision tree based
classifier
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We tested our model using 4 different neural network based classifiers, and then we tested it
using a decision tree based classifier. A summary of the results can be found in table 5.1.
As is evident from table 5.1 and from the ROC curves in Figures 5.1, 5.3, 5.5, and 5.7, the AUC
of neural networks using the ReLU activation function is slightly lower than that of the ones using
the sigmoid activation function. Moreover, although the AUC of the decision tree classifier is the
highest, the true positive rate of this model is same or lower when capped at 1% false positive rate
as compared to the ReLU based neural networks. The confusion matrices for the models in Figures
5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 5.8, 5.11 show a better visualization of the classification performance of each model.
Since ReLU appears to obtain the best results, we compare the ROC curve of the ReLU based
neural network, and the decision tree classifier in Figures 5.9 and 5.10.

Figure 5.1: ROC Curve of model using Neural Network (Sigmoid)

5.4

Real World Testing

The final step in testing whether a model is effective or not is to attempt to test it in real world
scenarios. We tested the best performing model of our proposed models (Neural Network with
Dropout (RelU)) against the decision tree model to check how well they perform in detecting
actual malicious PE files. The results are summarized in Table 5.2.
We used a sample set of 997 samples from VirusShare.com [Rob11] for testing. Unfortunately,
the samples on VirusShare.com are accessible by registration only, hence the sample set itself cannot
be shared publicly. The file name of the sample set is: VirusShare_x86-64_WinEXE_20130711.zip
The results obtained from the neural network based model are as expected based on the results
we saw before. Of the 997 samples tested, 994 were correctly classified. The decision tree based
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Figure 5.2: Confusion Matrix of model using Neural Network (Sigmoid)

Figure 5.3: ROC Curve of model using Neural Network with Dropout (Sigmoid)
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Figure 5.4: Confusion Matrix of model using Neural Network with Dropout (Sigmoid)

Figure 5.5: ROC Curve of model using Neural Network (ReLU)
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Figure 5.6: Confusion Matrix of model using Neural Network (ReLU)

Figure 5.7: ROC Curve of model using Neural Network with Dropout (ReLU)
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Figure 5.8: Confusion Matrix of model using Neural Network with Dropout (ReLU)

Figure 5.9: ROC Curves of model using Neural Network (ReLU) and using Decision Tree
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Figure 5.10: ROC Curves of model using Neural Network with Dropout (ReLU) and using Decision
Tree

Figure 5.11: Confusion Matrix of model using Decision Tree
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Model Classifier
Neural Network with Dropout (ReLU)
Decision Tree

Execution Time (seconds)
128.2
133.6

Accuracy
0.997
0.117

Table 5.2: Results from real world testing
model however, was only able to classify 117 of the 997 samples. It is difficult to determine the
cause of this result without further testing.

5.5

Source Code Availability

All source code used for creating the model, experimentation, and testing is available to download
on https://github.com/preppie22/malware-classifier. The dataset used for training and testing the
models is available at https://github.com/endgameinc/ember. Please refer to the guide published
on their page to reproduce the result of the LightGBM model discussed above.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In our research, we demonstrate that the use of deep neural networks for static malware detection
is viable and has potential for further improvement. Our experiments show that even in situations
involving structured data, the use of neural networks can still be more efficient compared to decision
trees. We established a method of file vectorization that can effectively summarize large files
for classification. The importance of availability of a large dataset in such domains cannot be
overlooked. This research shows that static malware analysis can be an effective tool in malware
classification in spite of the existence and established detection rates of dynamic malware analysis
Further research in this area will be required the establish how efficient neural networks can be
as classifiers for structured data as compared to decision tree models. Real world testing has shown
that there are still gaps in this area that have not been explored and will require further testing
for practical implementation.
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